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Introduction
The global economy has, since the second half of 2007,
experienced a deep financial crisis.  This has been reflected in
significant falls in asset prices, a sharp contraction in global
output and precipitous falls in international trade flows 
(Chart 1).  There have been significant negative effects on the
United Kingdom, with UK real GDP falling by 5.5% between 
2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2.
While the proximate causes of the crisis lie within financial
markets, the build-up of substantial global macroeconomic
imbalances over the past decade may also have contributed
significantly.(2)(3) One imbalance of the UK economy,
discussed in previous Inflation Reports,(4) has been the
persistent UK current account deficit which has accompanied
sustained growth of UK domestic demand.  
One manifestation of global imbalances is that during the
period of robust global growth preceding the crisis, a number
of other advanced economies experienced growing current
account deficits, most notably the United States (Chart 2).(5)
In contrast, commodity exporters and many East Asian
economies (EAEs) experienced growing current account
surpluses with the largest increases being in the oil-exporting
economies and China.
The financial crisis has been a key influence on the prospects
for UK inflation.  From a monetary policy perspective, it is
therefore important to try to understand why the crisis
happened, including the contribution of global imbalances.
The recent financial crisis has put the spotlight on the rapid rise in credit which preceded it and the
macroeconomic context in which it developed.  This article examines the contribution of
international savings and investment imbalances to the crisis and how these imbalances have
evolved since its onset, focusing on the UK experience as a deficit country over the past decade.  It
also briefly discusses some implications of the crisis for global imbalances over the medium term.  
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(2) See, for example, Bean (2009), Tucker (2008a, b, 2009).
(3) Surveys of the causes of the crisis can be found in Acharya and Richardson (2009) and
Bank for International Settlements (2009).
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Report discusses global imbalances, which are also examined in a box in the May 2002
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(5) Japan and Germany were important exceptions and the euro area as a whole was
broadly in balance.
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Chart 1 Global GDP and world trade
Source:  IMF April 2009 World Economic Outlook (WEO) and July 2009 update.



























































































































Chart 2 Global imbalances in the run-up to the crisis
Source:  IMF April 2009 WEO.
(a) ‘East Asia excluding China’ includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
(b) ‘Oil exporters’ includes OPEC countries, Norway and Russia.Research and analysis Global imbalances and the financial crisis 179
Large global imbalances can be undesirable.  For example, the
continuation of these imbalances poses a risk of large
corrections in asset prices and exchange rates, and these can
have important implications for growth and inflation.(1)
The link between the financial crisis and these global
imbalances is complex.  This article discusses some of the
factors underlying global imbalances.  It shows how they were
linked to international capital flows, which contributed to a fall
in global real interest rates and an extended global credit
boom.  Importantly, however, other factors such as financial
innovation and the underpricing of risk exacerbated those
effects during the boom period, giving rise to vulnerabilities in
the global economy.  This article also considers the role these
vulnerabilities may have played in amplifying the scale and
impact of the subsequent financial crisis.  The adjustments of
global imbalances which have accompanied the financial crisis
and some of the factors which may affect their longer-term
evolution, are also discussed.  
How were global imbalances and the credit
boom linked?
Various forces simultaneously contributed to the combination
of global imbalances and a global credit boom.  This section
first examines the causes of increased international capital
flows, which may have been an important contributory factor,
before discussing the mechanisms which generated and
amplified the effect on credit supply and demand. 
Global savings and investment
A country’s current account balance represents the difference
between the savings and investment flows in that country.
Non-zero current account balances are associated with
international capital flows — countries running current
account deficits (surpluses) experience capital inflows
(outflows).  So the global current account imbalances in recent
years (Chart 2) have been associated with substantial capital
flows from the high-saving EAEs and commodity producers to
lower-saving western countries.
Economic theory suggests that international capital flows
should reflect differences in rates of return on investments
across countries.  If a particular country offers relatively high
expected returns it will tend to attract more capital from
abroad, thereby allowing its investment to exceed
domestically available savings, and resulting in a current
account deficit.
From this perspective, the international pattern of current
accounts and capital flows in recent years appears puzzling.
Faster-growing economies, for example those in East Asia,
would typically be expected to offer higher rates of return on
investment than the more mature industrialised economies.
So the net capital flows from East Asia (and commodity
producers) towards industrialised countries seem to suggest
that international capital had been ‘flowing uphill’.(2)
So what accounts for those capital flows and current account
imbalances?  Examining changes in the saving and investment
patterns in different regions, the counterparts to the capital
flows and current account positions, provide some initial
information.  In particular, at an accounting level, the
dominant drivers of the ‘uphill’ capital flows over the past
decade have been the high and rising savings of the current
account surplus countries (EAEs and oil producers) and the
lower and falling savings of the current account deficit
economies (Chart 3).  Changes in investment rates in different
regions, such as the falls in Asian investment following the
1997–98 currency crisis, and their subsequent rise, have been
more muted.
What caused the East Asian countries and commodity
producers to become exporters of capital?
The contribution of EAEs and commodity producers to 
global imbalances reflects both their high savings and the
tendency to direct those savings to countries such as the
United States and the United Kingdom.  Both structural and
macroeconomic factors appear to have contributed to the 
high savings rates, while policy choices and levels of financial
market development help account for the direction of the
flows.  
The low degree of social security provision is an important
structural factor contributing to high savings in East Asia.  In
(1) See the July 2009 Monetary Policy Committee minutes and the July 2006 Financial
Stability Report, for example. 
(2) See Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007), for example.
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Chart 3 Savings and investment rates in current account
deficit and surplus regions(a)
Source:  IMF WEO.
(a) Surplus regions are those with current account surpluses greater than 1% of GDP in 2008 and
include Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia, Developing Asia, Japan, 
Middle East and Newly Industrialised Asia;  deficit regions are those with current account
deficits greater than 1% of GDP in 2008 and include Central and Eastern Europe, Sub-Sahara
Africa, United Kingdom and United States.180 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
the case of China, for example, Chamon and Prasad (2009)
argue that precautionary motives are one of the strongest
candidates for explaining rises in the household savings rate.
For example, they discuss how private sector education and
health expenditures have increased significantly in recent
years, in part because the government has scaled back public
sector support in these areas.  
But there were also a number of macroeconomic influences.
The rapid acceleration in global growth, given sluggish growth
in commodity supply, led to marked increases in oil prices —
see Saporta, Trott and Tudela (2009)(1) — and the prices of
other commodities which boosted commodity-exporting
countries’ income from net trade.  And, as was the case
alongside the 1970s’ and 1980s’ oil price rises, expenditure in
commodity-exporting countries lagged behind that rise in
income.
Another important macroeconomic factor was the large
contribution of exports to the growth of the EAEs.  An increase
in exports leads directly to an increase in domestic income but
is not necessarily associated with an increase in domestic
spending.  To the extent that this extra income is not spent it
will tend to create excess saving.  But why were the exports of
the EAEs so strong?  And why did they direct their excess
savings to industrialised countries, such as the United States
and the United Kingdom, instead of using them to finance
more investment at home?
An important factor was the adoption of managed exchange
rate policies by some EAEs,(2) whereby a particular level of
their currency was targeted, usually against the US dollar.  This
policy was prompted, in part, by the aim of spurring economic
development through exports, thereby addressing extensive
rural underemployment.(3)(4) The desire to accumulate foreign
exchange reserves as insurance against a repeat of the
1997–98 Asian currency crises was an additional motivation.(5)
Another factor may have been the slow pace of financial
development in many EAEs which meant that there was a
dearth of domestic investment opportunities (see Caballero 
et al (2008)).  This may have necessitated savings being
channelled to the deeper and more liquid financial markets in
western economies.
The managed exchange rate policy was implemented through
foreign exchange interventions.  Countries running current
account surpluses would normally be expected to experience
some upward pressure on their currencies.  But many EAE
monetary authorities offset this pressure by selling domestic
assets and accumulating foreign currency reserves, principally
US dollar-denominated bonds.  This policy was sustainable
because, in contrast to countries selling foreign exchange
reserves to forestall currency depreciations, there is no
fundamental constraint to the amount of foreign exchange
reserves that a country can accumulate in preventing its
currency from appreciating.  Orientating monetary policy
towards managing the exchange rate rather than domestic
price stability will, however, tend to eventually be associated
with upward pressure on inflation if the monetary policy of the
anchor country (the United States in this case) is too loose for
the pegging country.  But for example in China’s case this was
not a problem because its productivity growth was sufficiently
fast to maintain inflation at a low level, and upward wage
pressure was limited by the rapid increase in its workforce.(6)
The global credit boom
The past decade was also characterised by rapid growth in
credit in deficit countries, underpinning a global credit boom
(Chart 4).  The excess savings in EAEs and commodity
exporters may have contributed to this.  Bernanke (2005) has
argued that the low and falling savings rates in deficit
countries which accompanied the credit boom, were
principally the outcome of an endogenous process by which
the excess savings of the surplus countries — the ‘global
savings glut’ — were recycled.  The mechanism by which this
occurred was a downward adjustment in the level of global
real interest rates which restored equilibrium between saving
and investment.  For example, since the mid-1990s, UK 
long-term real interest rates derived from index-linked
instruments declined by more than 2 percentage points.  Real
long-term interest rates have also fallen in other countries
(Chart 5).(7)
(1) Tucker (2008b) discusses the role of the entry of energy-intensive developing
countries.  
(2) This was most apparent for China.  Other EAEs also, however, had significantly less
volatile exchange rates than the euro or the yen (Committee on the Global Financial
System (2009)).
(3) For a discussion of the choice of exchange rate regimes in emerging Asian economies
see, among others, Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
(4) This was particularly the case for China, whose exports rose by over 27% per annum
between 2002 and 2008.  
(5) A strategy recommended by, for example, Feldstein (1999).
(6) Inflation did, however, rise significantly in oil-exporting countries.
(7) Shiller (2007) argues that although real long-term interest rates in the G7 declined
over this period they only fell back to their long-run historical average.  Others, such
as Bems, Dedola and Smets (2007) and Bracke and Fidora (2008) have argued that
monetary factors were important from the early 2000s onwards.  For an overview of
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Chart 4 Private sector loans(a)
Sources:  European Central Bank, IMF and Bank calculations.
(a) Claims on the domestic private sector by banks and, where available, other financial
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But there were a number of factors other than international
capital flows which may have contributed to the falling saving
rates in deficit countries.  For example, Berry, Waldron and
Williams (2009) discuss the effect on the UK household saving
rate of demographic factors and pensions, greater
macroeconomic stability (via lower precautionary saving
flows), rising asset prices, and looser credit conditions (which
are discussed further below).  Moreover, Bean (2008) argues
that the downward pressure on real long-term interest rates
may itself have been reinforced by loose monetary policy in
some countries.(1)
Counterparts to the decline in saving rates were strong
domestic demand and wider current account deficits.  For
example, in the United States and the United Kingdom,
domestic demand began to grow more rapidly than GDP in the
late 1990s (Chart 6).  This interacted with exchange rate
appreciations and the entry of low-cost producers such as
China in the world trading system to produce wider current
account deficits.
As consumption and investment increased in deficit countries
demand for credit also increased, underpinning the global
credit boom.  However, as Berry, Waldron and Williams (2009)
note, the rapid build-up in credit in the United Kingdom did
not necessarily imply a boom in household consumption.
Rather, as Nickell (2004) points out, much of the credit was
used to finance purchases of housing and financial assets
rather than goods and services.  The credit boom was therefore
closely linked to balance sheet expansion.  From this
perspective, while capital flows likely added to the growth of
credit, they do not seem large enough to take the lion’s share
of the blame (see Bean (2009)).
However, in addition to their interaction with macroeconomic
factors, capital flows may have further contributed to the
credit expansion by encouraging a ‘search for yield’ by financial
market participants.  Although some of the capital flows were
used to fund loans to households and firms directly, the
majority were used to purchase existing safe assets, such as
government bonds, which caused real long-term interest rates
to fall (Chart 5).(2) This not only encouraged other investors to
buy riskier assets but may also have contributed to the balance
sheet expansion.  The low interest rate environment seems to
have interacted with strong competitive pressures on banks
and asset managers to maintain returns, leading to a ‘search
for yield’ in financial markets.(3) The October 2008 Financial
Stability Report discussed how this was evident in reduced
discrimination between assets of differing credit quality and
the development of increasingly complex financial instruments
employing leverage to generate higher returns.
Investors reportedly justified this ‘search for yield’ with the
perception that financial market risks had declined.  One
element of this — lower credit risk premia — was underpinned
by the continued stability of both macroeconomic and
financial variables (often known as the ‘great moderation’,
Chart 7).  The low inflation environment associated with this
stability also permitted a loosening in global monetary policy
following the stock market crash in 2000–01.  This may have
increased confidence in the stabilising power of monetary
policy, and hence in continued stability going forward.
Financial market participants were lulled into a false sense of
security by extrapolating only from recent benign data,
thereby attaching low probabilities to adverse outcomes.  This
‘disaster myopia’ may have contributed to the price of risk
being set too low (see Haldane (2009)).
The credit expansion was also facilitated by the decline in
perceived liquidity risk.  Illiquid financial markets can be
defined as containing a shortage of investors willing to
purchase assets at the prevailing price when other investors
attempt to sell.  This can mean that the price received for an
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Chart 5 Real long-term interest rates(a)(b)
(a) United States and United Kingdom derived from index-linked securities.  Euro area derived
from inflation swaps.  Ten-year real forward rates for the United Kingdom and the euro area,
nine-year forward rates for the United States.
(b) UK data are adjusted for RPI.















Chart 6 Domestic demand to GDP ratios
Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(1) See also Taylor (2007), among others.
(2) See, for example, Warnock and Warnock (2005).
(3) See Tucker (2008b) and October 2008 Financial Stability Report.  asset is less than its underlying value.  The years preceding the
financial crisis were characterised by abundant liquidity in
financial markets. 
An important driver of the apparent declines in both credit and
liquidity risk was financial innovation, driven in part by
increased competitive pressures associated with the ‘search for
yield’, and made possible by financial liberalisation in many
advanced markets.  A first form of innovation was the
securitisation of mortgages, corporate loans and other 
assets.  This ‘created’ higher-quality financial securities that
were viewed in many cases as being less risky than the
underlying assets, in part because they pooled a wide range of
assets together.  
An associated innovation was that banks changed their funding
models.  In particular, banks sold the new types of securities to
end-investors via the so-called ‘shadow banking system’,
encompassing structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and
conduits, which provided a framework for lending and
borrowing without accepting deposits.  This was termed the
‘originate to distribute’ model:  aiming to spread the risks
associated with securitised assets off their balance sheets,
banks sold them to SIVs, which then aimed to sell them on to
end-investors.(1) At the same time, banks increasingly relied on
wholesale funding markets, including in selling the securitised
assets, see the October 2008 Financial Stability Report.  The
magenta bars in Chart 8 show that the share of funding by 
UK banks derived from securitisations increased between 2000
and 2008.(2)
In summary, the credit boom in deficit countries was one of
the mechanisms which ensured that global saving and
investment balanced.  The capital flows associated with global
imbalances were an important element of this.  By reducing
real long-term interest rates on safe assets these flows
encouraged other investors to invest in riskier assets such as
securitised assets and expand their balance sheets.  If western
financial markets had not responded in this way the global real
interest rate may have needed to have fallen even further in
order to bring global savings and investment into balance.
Why did the financial crisis occur?  What were
the main channels and mechanisms?
The risks posed to the world economy by global imbalances
had been widely discussed by policymakers, academics and
market participants.  It was, however, often thought that the
correction of global imbalances would, in part, occur via a
dollar depreciation following a slowing of international capital
flows to the United States.(3)
This section discusses why it was the processes analysed above
— and not a dollar depreciation — that eventually resulted in
the financial crisis which engulfed the global economy.  It first
summarises the vulnerabilities generated during the build-up
of imbalances and then considers the triggers of the financial
crisis. 
Increased vulnerabilities
The processes discussed in the previous section generated
substantial vulnerabilities to the global economy.  On one
hand, they led to high leverage in both the international
financial system and the real economies of countries such as
the United Kingdom and the United States.  At the same time,
they were linked to the underpricing of both credit and
liquidity risk.  
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Chart 8 Sources of UK banking sector funding(a)
(a) Quarterly data, six-month totals.
(1) Tucker (2007) discussed the risk of those exposures flowing back onto banks’ balance
sheets.  In the United States shadow banks also played a more direct role in lending,
with the share of non-bank loans to households and non-financial corporations in the
total rising from the late 1990s.
(2) Note that these data overstate the role of securitisations in bank funding somewhat,
since they include securitisations retained on banks’ balance sheets.
(3) See, for example, Blanchard et al (2005) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2007).  However a
number of authors had argued that these imbalances were sustainable in the medium
term.  See, for example, Dooley et al (2004, 2008, 2009).
















Chart 7 Volatility of real GDP growth(a)
Sources:  ONS, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Five-year rolling average of annualised volatility of quarter-on-quarter growth rate.  
2008 data are to Q2.Research and analysis Global imbalances and the financial crisis 183
The high leverage in the real economy was concentrated in the
household sector.(1) Much of the debt was secured against
housing assets which had rapidly increased in price and
thereby created a vulnerability to house price falls.  In addition,
in the United Kingdom, although income gearing of
households remained low in aggregate this masked
considerable variation across households.(2) This created a
vulnerability to a change in economic conditions. 
High leverage of financial institutions also generated its own
vulnerabilities.  With such high leverage, changes in market
conditions can have an amplified effect on both the asset
prices and the health of financial institutions (see the 
October 2008 Financial Stability Report).
The funding structure of financial institutions, with its reliance
on wholesale markets and the use of securitised assets 
(Chart 8), was a related vulnerability.  In particular, this
funding model relied on the continued functioning of those
markets.  This funding often came from foreign investors and
this, together with banks’ increased lending overseas and the
growth of the shadow banking system, generated the further
vulnerability of increased and complex cross-border linkages
between both financial institutions and between countries
more generally.  Such complex international linkages
potentially give rise to unappreciated, but potent,
interconnections between firms in the global financial system.  
Associated with both of those vulnerabilities, at a global level
banking flows accounted for more than half of the gross
capital flows across countries (see the June 2009 Financial
Stability Report).  The UK banking sector was active in this
process of rising international leverage, with its gross
international asset and liabilities rising to nearly three times
GDP in recent years (Chart 9).  Those banking sector flows
represented around half of the United Kingdom’s substantial
total foreign gross asset and liability positions, although the
net foreign position of both the UK banking sector and the UK
as a whole were significantly smaller.(3)
High leverage and overreliance on wholesale markets for
funding were exacerbated by the mispricing of risk in the
financial system discussed in the previous section.  This
vulnerability stemmed, in part, from the fact that the 
end-investors who purchased the securitised assets had less
information about the underlying risk of these securities than
the banks who originated the lending.  And the originating
banks may not have faced as strong incentives to assess and
monitor risk as end-investors would have liked.  Added to that,
the scenarios which investors were considering when pricing
(securitised) assets were too narrow, being based upon the
patterns of recent history.  It had also not been envisaged that
the liquidity that helped fund these assets could dry up as
quickly as it did.
Triggers and amplification mechanisms
The financial crisis affecting the global economy over the past
two years reflects the vulnerabilities of the financial and
macroeconomic situation being exposed.  Indeed, Bean (2008)
argues that the capital flows from surplus countries and the
consequent introduction of securitised products and larger role
for the shadow banking system represented ‘fuel for the fire’ of
the financial crisis.  
The crisis was triggered by growing delinquencies and a loss of
confidence in the US housing market (see the October 2007
Financial Stability Report).  As has already been discussed, the
credit risk associated with securitised assets, including those
backed by mortgages, had been underpriced.  This was
particularly the case for sub-prime borrowers who did not fulfil
traditional credit standards and were hence riskier to lend to.
Notwithstanding, lenders had extended mortgages with
temporarily low interest rates.  As those deals expired many
sub-prime borrowers were unable to refinance at the same low
rates, which initiated a spiral of rising delinquency rates and
falling house prices (Chart 10).  Since US mortgages were the
underlying asset in a large proportion of securitised assets, this
undermined confidence in markets for securitised assets more
generally.  
This caused a large-scale reassessment of the quality of
securitised assets.  The previous assumption that such assets
had similar risk characteristics to more traditional assets such
as government and corporate bonds was exposed as false.  Not
only were defaults higher than expected but they were also
more correlated.  Coval et al (2008) explain that the structure
of securitised assets meant that their prices fell considerably
more than traditional assets.  More generally, asset price
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Chart 9 UK international investment position (IIP) and
the role of financial institutions
(1) See Hume and Sentance (2009).
(2) See the box on page 21 of the November 2008 Inflation Report.
(3) Astley, Pain and Smith (2009) discuss the potential maturity and currency
mismatches on the UK external balance sheet and the relatively large size of the UK
banking sector compared with those in other countries. 184 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
may not have taken this effect fully into account, they may
have underestimated their balance sheet risks (see Haldane
(2009)). 
As the extent of the credit risk mispricing became clear, the
markets for securitised assets broke down amid sudden
repricings of risk.  The complexity of securitised assets led to
investor uncertainty over which financial institutions were
most exposed to falls in their value.  This increased perceptions
of counterparty risk in interbank credit markets, leading to a
substantial increase in the cost of interbank lending (Chart 11),
with low transaction volumes.
These market developments adversely affected the funding of
financial institutions, particularly those with a heavy reliance
on issuance of securitised assets and the continued liquidity of
wholesale markets for funding, such as Northern Rock building
society.(1) In September 2007, the Chancellor announced a
Government guarantee for the existing depositors of 
Northern Rock,(2) prior to the temporary nationalisation of
that institution in February 2008.
But more generally, the strong and complex interlinkages in
the international financial system meant that the initial trigger
of problems in the US housing market affected financial
institutions in a large number of countries.  Globally, financial
institutions responded by hoarding liquid assets (see Tucker
(2008b)).  The dramatic fall in market liquidity (Chart 12) was
an important mechanism amplifying the negative effects on
prices of securitised assets and other risky assets of the initial
repricing of risk.
Such adverse dynamics were exacerbated by the high leverage
of financial institutions.  In particular, the elevated fears over
the adequacy of financial institutions’ capital contributed to a
number of financial institutions around the world liquidating
asset positions in order to attempt to rebuild their capital.  
But such deleveraging generated further sharp asset price falls
— there were few willing purchasers of such assets since many
potential buyers were suffering from the same problems.(3)
There have also been adverse feedback cycles between
financial markets and the real economy.  In particular, as
discussed in the October 2008 Financial Stability Report, falling
asset prices and uncertainty about their values together with a
deteriorating economic outlook caused concerns about banks’
capital positions.(4) This contributed to banks tightening credit
conditions, which in turn further weakened economic
prospects.  















Chart 11 Three-month Libor-OIS spreads(a)
Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of three-month London interbank offered rate (Libor) to three-month overnight index
swap (OIS) rates.  Five-day moving average.
















Chart 12 Financial market liquidity(a)
Sources:  Bank of England, Bloomberg, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Debt Management
Office, London Stock Exchange, Merrill Lynch, Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) The liquidity index shows the number of standard deviations from the mean.  It is a simple
unweighted average of nine liquidity measures, normalised on the period 1999–2004.  The
series shown is an exponentially weighted moving average.  The indicator is more reliable
after 1997 as it is based on a greater number of underlying measures.
(1) Box A in the October 2007 Financial Stability Report provides a detailed discussion of
the funding crisis at Northern Rock and the UK authorities’ initial response.
(2) See the October 2007 Financial Stability Report.
(3) Brunnermeier (2009) discusses the loss spirals that can be associated with leveraged
positions.  Adrian and Shin (2008) find strong correlation between US banks’ leverage
and the size of their balance sheets.  
(4) Capital ratios did, however, remain above regulatory minima.  See the October 2008
Financial Stability Report, pages 26–27.
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Chart 10 US housing market indicators
Sources:  Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), Federal Reserve and Standard & Poor’s.
(a) Mortgage delinquency rates are defined as the proportion of loans past due 30 days or more
and still accruing interest as well as those in non-accrual status, measured as a percentage of
end-of-period loans.Research and analysis Global imbalances and the financial crisis 185
This combination of deleveraging flows, adverse feedbacks
between financial markets and the macroeconomy and
increasing pressures in interbank funding markets reached a
significant stress point with the failure of Lehman Brothers, a
major US securities house, in September 2008.(1)
At that time the international financial system came close to
breakdown, see King (2009).  In the latter part of 2008 and
early 2009 this prompted exceptional interventions by
governments and central banks in a number of countries to
help stabilise the banking system.  Such actions included
liquidity insurance, asset protection and capital investment in
banking sectors combined with cuts in official interest rates to
historic lows and, in the United Kingdom, the introduction of a
large-scale asset purchase programme.
How has the crisis affected global
imbalances?
The financial crisis has generated a severe, and relatively
synchronised, global recession driven by a collapse in
confidence and demand (see the June 2009 Financial Stability
Report and recent Inflation Reports).  UK real GDP fell by 5.5%
between 2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2.  The global downturn has, at
least temporarily, reversed some of the forces contributing to
global imbalances, leading to some limited rebalancing.  This
section discusses that macroeconomic adjustment, with an
emphasis on recent developments in the United Kingdom.
Whether rebalancing will persist in a structural sense is the
subject of the next section.
Adjustment in the United Kingdom and other deficit
countries
The previous section discussed how a number of financial
institutions around the world liquidated asset positions during
the crisis in order to attempt to rebuild their capital positions.
Much of that international retrenchment showed up in 
cross-border flows, with banks’ lending abroad falling more
sharply than domestic lending, consistent with some ‘home
bias’ in bank lending (see the June 2009 Financial Stability
Report).  UK banks also liquidated international asset positions,
which largely accounted for the United Kingdom’s significant
sales of foreign assets during the crisis (Chart 13).
Nevertheless, UK bank leverage remains high (see the June
2009 Financial Stability Report).  
The international cross-border capital repatriation was one of
the factors that contributed to reduced credit supply to UK
residents.  There was a sharp reduction in credit made available
directly to UK residents by foreign banks, which had played a
key role in the expansion of lending to UK residents prior to the
crisis (see the May 2009 Inflation Report).  And alongside the
sharp rises in interbank interest rates (Chart 11), the capital
repatriation may have adversely affected UK banks’ ability to
access funds in wholesale markets — during the crisis there
was a sharp outflow of foreign capital from UK monetary and
financial institutions (Chart 13).  The need for UK banks to
rebuild their capital positions also contributed to UK banks
reducing the supply of credit to UK residents.  The sharp fall in
lending by UK banks to UK corporates and households 
(Chart 14), however, appears in part to have reflected lower
demand for bank loans as UK activity contracted (see the
August 2009 Inflation Report).
This reduction in the availability of credit was associated with
a sharp contraction of UK domestic demand during the crisis
(Charts 6 and 15), thereby in part reversing the imbalance
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Chart 14 Net bank lending to private non-financial
corporations (PNFCs) and households(a)
(a) Sterling lending excluding the effects of securitisations and loan transfers.
(b) Recessions are defined as two consecutive quarters of falling output (at constant market
prices) estimated using the latest data.  The recessions are assumed to end once output
began to rise, apart from the 1970s where two separate occasions of falling output are
treated as a single recession.
(c) Sum of:  secured lending to households;  unsecured lending to households;  and lending to
unincorporated businesses and non profit making institutions serving households, over the
periods where data are available.
(1) See the October 2008 Financial Stability Reportfor a detailed description of this
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the constrained credit supply contributed to falls in UK house
prices which started in late 2007 and to a flattening out in the
household debt to income ratio.  UK household savings also
rose during the crisis (Chart 16), reflecting tighter credit
conditions and other factors such as increased job uncertainty
(see Berry, Waldron and Williams (2009)). 
As discussed above, the counterpart to the strength of UK
domestic demand prior to the crisis was persistent external
deficits.  But the UK current account deficit was narrower
during the crisis period than in 2006 and 2007.  UK net trade
improved during the crisis, despite the collapse in world trade
(Chart 1), as the weakness of UK demand contributed to UK
imports falling by more than UK exports.  The improvement in
UK net trade also in part reflected the 20% depreciation of the
sterling effective exchange rate which occurred between
August 2007 and June 2009 (Chart 17).  This depreciation
appears to have been driven by a combination of the impact of
deleveraging flows, concerns about UK relative
macroeconomic prospects and the riskiness of UK assets, and
perceptions of the need for the UK economy to rebalance.  But
there remains considerable uncertainty about the precise
sources of the depreciation and their timing — see Astley, Pain
and Smith (2009).
As well as stimulating net trade, sterling’s depreciation during
the crisis increased the sterling value of UK net external asset
holdings (Chart 18).  Indeed, those positive valuation effects
from sterling’s depreciation played an important role in
shifting the United Kingdom from a net external debt position
in 2008 Q3 to a net external asset position by 2009 Q1 
(Chart 9).  Those revaluation effects reflected the fact that the
majority of UK external assets were denominated in foreign
currencies, while UK liabilities were predominately in sterling,
combined with the extremely large gross external assets and
liabilities.(1) As such, in recent years fluctuations in the UK net
external asset position have been more affected by
movements in sterling and other asset prices than by the













Chart 15 Cumulative change in real GDP and
contributions of components over 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1
Sources:  Thomson Datastream and Bank calculations.
(a) Contributions of net trade to GDP.
(b) Contributions of domestic demand to GDP.













Chart 16 Household saving ratios
Sources:  Bureau of Economic Analysis and ONS.
(a) Percentage of households’ post-tax income.
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Chart 17 Real effective exchange rates(a)
Sources:  Bank for International Settlements and Bank calculations.
(a) Broad indices based on CPI.
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Chart 18 Reconciliation of changes in UK net external
assets (IIP)
Note:  ‘Other changes’ category omitted.
Sources:  Bank calculations based on Bank of England, IMF and ONS data.
(1) See Whitaker (2006) for a discussion of the composition of UK assets and liabilities as
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negative ‘flow’ effects of persistent current account deficits
(Chart 18).
Other exchange rates also moved sharply during the crisis.
Even though the crisis originated in the United States, the
dollar appreciated as the crisis intensified (Chart 17).  This
seems in part to again reflect deleveraging flows (see Astley,
Pain and Smith (2009)).  In particular, large-scale sales of
foreign assets by US institutional investors, as they sought to
repatriate funds, accounted for the financing of the US current
account deficit in 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1 (see the June 2009
Financial Stability Report).  Despite declining from their high
pre-crisis levels, foreign purchases of US assets on the whole
also remained positive during the crisis, due in part to the 
US dollar’s status as a reserve currency. 
Other aspects of the US adjustment to the financial crisis are,
however, more similar to the United Kingdom, with some
rebalancing of the economy again being apparent.  In
particular, a sharp slowdown in lending and the wealth losses
from asset price falls were associated with a significant rise in
the US household savings ratio (Chart 16).  This private sector
retrenchment was, however, offset by higher government
borrowing, associated with cyclical falls in revenue and
financial sector support (Chart 19).  With national savings
remaining broadly unchanged, the narrowing of the 2009 Q1
US current account to its smallest deficit since 1999 
(Chart 20) was to a large extent due to a sharp decline in
private investment.  The significant fall in oil prices in the
second half of 2008 also meant that the value of imports
decreased significantly.(1)
Adjustment in surplus countries
The lower oil price has also played an important role in
reducing the current account surpluses of oil-exporting
countries.  The IMF forecasts that their combined surplus will
all but disappear in 2009 (Chart 20). 
For China, a large importer of oil, lower oil prices on their own
would imply a higher trade surplus because the value of oil
imports falls.  But over past quarters, China’s trade surplus has
declined as total imports fell by less than exports.  In 2009 Q2,
the trade surplus narrowed to its lowest level in three years.
Some of this may be due to the appreciation of China’s real
effective exchange rate, having pegged the renminbi closely to
the US dollar throughout the crisis (Chart 17).  But China’s
substantial fiscal stimulus also appears to have succeeded in
keeping domestic demand, particularly investment, growing at
a robust pace.(2)
The pattern of a smaller fall in imports than exports was
mirrored in other surplus countries such as Germany and
Japan.  Over 2008 Q4 and 2009 Q1, these countries
experienced sharper contractions in activity than the deficit
countries, in part reflected by the fact that the fall in world
demand has been disproportionately concentrated in
intensively internationally traded items such as capital goods
and consumer durables (see May 2009 Inflation Report).
Output was driven down by the stark fall in exports relative to
imports, with domestic demand falling by less (Chart 15).  This
is in contrast to deficit countries such as the United States and
United Kingdom where the decline in output was more than
driven by domestic demand.  As a result, the current account
surpluses of Germany and Japan have narrowed sharply since
the onset of the crisis (Chart 20).
Will the crisis have lasting effects on global
imbalances? 
The crisis has been unprecedented in several respects,(3) so
there are considerable uncertainties surrounding the likely
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Chart 19 US net borrowing
Sources:  Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve and Bank calculations.

















Chart 20 Current account balances(a)
Sources:  IMF April 2009 WEO, various national accounts and Bank calculations.
(a) For Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States diamond is 2009 Q1 observation, for
China and oil exporters is the IMF April 2009 WEOforecast for 2009.
(b) Oil exporters include OPEC countries, Norway and Russia.
(1) Oil prices fell from around $130/barrel in July 2008 to around $40/barrel in 
December 2008 — see Saporta, Trott and Tudela (2009).  They subsequently rose
however, to around $70/barrel in June 2009.
(2) See the World Bank’s quarterly update on China in June 2009.
(3) See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) and Borio (2008).path of adjustment, and previous crises may not provide a
reliable guide to the pattern of adjustment.
The previous section showed how the recent partial correction
in global imbalances was driven by several factors including a
more pronounced fall in domestic demand in deficit countries
than surplus countries, exchange rate adjustment in some
countries such as the United Kingdom, and a steep drop in
commodity prices.  But if the correction of global imbalances
is to persist as the global economy recovers, some structural
rebalancing in global demand is also likely to be required.
Whether increased private saving in deficit countries will be
sustained is a major uncertainty in this regard.  Another
uncertainty is whether the changes in saving behaviour
required for rebalancing are taking hold in the EAEs.  Some
reforms encouraging household consumption in surplus
countries are already under way but are likely to take some
time to affect behaviour.
One lesson from the crisis is that the persistence of global
imbalances may also depend on the ability of deficit 
countries to supply enough high-quality assets to meet the
demands of investors.  In the short run, increased supply of
government bonds resulting from the expansionary fiscal
policies pursued in deficit countries has provided an ongoing
source of asset supply to meet the investment demand from
surplus countries.  However, to the extent that savers in
surplus countries may become more reluctant over time to
invest funds in deficit-country government bonds this 
would tend to raise the cost of borrowing in deficit countries.
This shift in the relative cost of borrowing could be an
important part of the process by which a rebalancing of
demand from deficit to surplus countries is achieved over the
medium term.
Conclusion
Global imbalances contributed to the financial crisis and
resulting recession through associated large capital flows.
Such capital flows contributed to a misallocation of funds and
the mispricing of risk.  Being a small open economy with a
large financial sector, the UK economy was greatly affected
and its recent experience is best understood in an international
context.
Relative price changes were important:  sterling’s depreciation
improved the United Kingdom’s net external asset position
and, alongside slowing demand, helped support net trade and
hence some narrowing of the UK current account deficit.  This
shift was mirrored in other countries, resulting in some partial
correction of global imbalances.
But whether such rebalancing in the United Kingdom and the
global economy can be sustained depends on structural forces,
including the extent to which consumers in deficit countries
remain restrained and domestic demand in surplus countries
picks up.
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